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Harry Wellington's Interpreting the Constitution offers a highly readable,
provocatively old-fashioned, and somewhat complacent account of constitutional
decisionmaking by the Supreme Court. The book is the first in a projected
series of discussions of legal topics for lay readers,' and the style is lucid and
engaging. But Interpreting the Constitution, which provides brisk critiques of
leading constitutional theories as well as an affirmative thesis that constitutional
adjudication should adhere to a "common law method," also presents a chal-
lenge to much of the recent constitutional scholarship produced by academic
lawyers for other academic lawyers.
Wellington's critical arguments generally achieve their aims. He exposes
flaws in the theories he discusses and reveals the dubious foundations of an
entire genre of scholarship that calls upon Supreme Court Justices to cast
themselves as political philosophers.
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His affirmative arguments require a more complex assessment. On the one
hand, Wellington argues that his preferred "common law method" reflects tried-
and-true norms of craft that both structure Supreme Court decisionmaking and
mark a path to substantively acceptable results.2 Writing in this vein, he makes
constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court sound comfortingly like the
kind of adjudication historically and relatively unproblematically performed by
other courts.' On the other hand, Wellington repeatedly emphasizes the "politi-
cal" dimension of Supreme Court adjudication. 4 He suggests that the Court's
decisionmaking should be responsive to public opinion,. and he welcomes
public efforts-such as protest marches on the Court building-to influence the
Justices.6 He also recognizes that legal conventions can and do change,7 sub-
stantially in response to Supreme Court practice. In sum, Wellington frequently
writes as if the Supreme Court were a moral and political decisionmaker,
relatively unconstrained by distinctively legal norms. Indeed, although he does
not expressly draw the comparison, much of his prose suggests that the Su-
preme Court has less in common with a paradigmatic common law adjudicator
than with the Council of Revision proposed but rejected at the Constitutional
2. Pp. 77-123.
3. In the eyes of some, common law adjudication-the characteristic stock and trade of American courts
and the type of judicial decisionmaking to which Wellington attempts to assimilate constitutional adjudica-
tion-has never been unproblematic at all. Bentham, for example, did not regard the common law as "law"
properly so-called. See Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, in A COMIENT ON THE
COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 161-62 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977). Two
features arguably give common law adjudication a suspect character. First, because common law rules
frequently lack any agreed canonical formulation and extend no further than their rationales, "it appears
as if the common law allows its rules to be remade in the process of application." Frederick Schauer, Is
the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 455 (1989). Second, "the values that guide a common law
court in modifying or discarding what had previously been thought to be a rule of law are moral, economic,
social, and political." Id. at 456. If rights can be overridden or adjusted in light of such considerations,
concerns arise about whether they are truly "rights" at all.
More typically, however, the common law tradition is an object of celebration, not excoriation, for
it is largely within the common law tradition that Western ideals of the rule of law and about the judicial
function in a government of separated powers took root. As thus celebrated, common law adjudication occurs
in the shadow of the legislature, which enjoys undoubted power to revise or set aside common law rules,
see GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4 (1982), and is relatively tightly
structured by conventions of legal reasoning, including stare decisis. On this model of common law
adjudication, the role of common law judges is a modest one, and change typically occurs only slowly, since
the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking depends at least partly on adjudication proceeding case-by-case and
in the shadow of the legislature. See id. at 75 ("slowness in common law change" is "almost inevitable"
since legitimacy of any common law change at all "depends ... on a willingness of courts to make law
incrementally and tentatively"). Wellington quite clearly wants to invoke the image of common law
adjudication as familiar and convention-bound, rather than problematic or unconstrained. See, e.g., p. 86
(arguing that constitutional decisionmaking is "constrained by the methodological and substantive conven-
tions of adjudication").
4. E.g., pp. 29, 83, 157.





Convention.' Such a council could have vetoed legislation on grounds of
morality or prudence, not just irreconcilability with constitutional commands.9
Wellington, I suspect, would deny any dualism in his thought that is not
also reflected in the institution he aims to portray.10 The Supreme Court, he
would probably contend, is neither a common law court nor a Council of
Revision, but is partly, and only imperfectly, analogous to each. Even so,
Interpreting the Constitution exhibits a residual two-mindedness that seems to
me to be interestingly representative of prevailing constitutional scholarship.
In certain moods, or when certain purposes are in mind, many observers tend
to view the Supreme Court as just another court, higher in the constitutional
hierarchy but constrained by the same obligation of fidelity to law as any other
tribunal t-the sort of institution that Hamilton probably envisioned when he
characterized the judiciary as "the least dangerous branch."' 2 When the Su-
preme Court deals sloppily or dismissively with precedent, we condemn it as
lawless, 3 and we worry that the Justices might pursue too political an agenda.
At other times, however, we think of the Court as a policymaker or moral
8. A Council of Revision was included in the series of resolutions that were proposed by Governor
Edmund Randolph of Virginia on May 29, 1787, and that became the focus of discussion when the
Convention began to meet as a Committee of the Whole. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION 20-23 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS]. Randolph's draft
provided:
Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought
to compose a council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National
Legislature before it shall operate... and that the dissent of the said Council shall
amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed...
by - of the members of each branch.
Id. at 21. The provision for a Council of Revision disappeared from the Convention's working draft on June
4, when the delegates voted (with six states in favor and four against) to vest the veto power in the "national
Executive" alone. Id. at 94. Motions to reconsider this action and to restore the Council of Revision were
defeated on June 6, July 21, and August 15. See id. at 131, 138-40; 2 id. at 71, 80.
9. See 2 id. at 73-74 (remarks of James Wilson) ("Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be
dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give
them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an opportunity of taking
notice of these characters of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the improper views
of the Legislature.").
10. Wellington begins the book with an account of the "dualism" inherent in the Court's roles of
deciding individual disputes and regulating the future. P. 3.
11. See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Jr., Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall: A True Commitment to the Rule
of Law, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 1991, at 60 (the rule of law forbids Supreme Court decisionmaking to
be "nothing more than politics by other means" and such decisionmaking cannot simply "twist and turn
with the politics of judicial retirements, appointments, and Senate confirmation'); cf LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AM ERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1988) (seeking "the outlines of an answer" to why the
Constitution should be regarded as legitimately barring legislation favored by current majorities in "the
parable of the pigeon"-an experiment showing that pigeons sometimes prefer to "bind their 'own future
freedom of choice") (citing G.W. Ainslie, Impulse Control in Pigeons, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
BEItAv. 485 (1974)).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
13. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2625 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Court's failure to follow doctrine of stare decisis as encouraging "blatant disregard for the rule of law");
Edley, supra note 11; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on Dworkin and the Two Faces of Law (Sept. 12,
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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conscience. 14 It is time, we say, to be honest about how political constitutional
adjudication inevitably is.15
Is the Supreme Court more properly assessed under the standards applicable
to a common law court or under criteria fit for a Council of Revision? Some-
times intentionally and sometimes unintentionally, Wellington's book suggests
that, if we are to appraise the Supreme Court's performance coherently, it is
time we got our paradigms in order.
II
Interpreting the Constitution deals with a practice of judicial review that
is subject to perennial, if not perpetual, legitimacy crises. 16 The Constitution
is law, and we tend to equate law with constraint. 7 Even the Supreme Court
is supposed to be bound by law.18 At the same time, many of us assume that
there must be a link between law, especially constitutional law, and justice.
Recent scholarship emphasizes this connection.19 Rejecting "authoritarian"
demands for adherence to the plain meaning of an old text and its original
understanding,2' this work calls on the Justices of the Supreme Court to func-
tion as moral philosophers. On this view, the Justices should make our constitu-
tional law morally the best it can be-though what will count as morally best
depends on what theory of moral philosophy a Justice happens to subscribe to.
Wellington cuts concisely through the modem debate as he understands it.
Originalism, he argues, fails to produce the kind of constraints that its adherents
seek.2" Justices would have a way of finding that the Constitution's Framers
intended what the Justices think the Framers ought to have intended.'
14. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 11, at 584 (Supreme Court must make "difficult substantive choices
among ... inevitably controverted political, social, and moral conceptions"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1266-68 (1987)
(discussing Supreme Court's need to make controversial value choices).
15. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note , at 584 ( [A] significant constitutional judgments... are inescap-
ably political."); Fallon, supra note 14, at 1266-68; Christopher Edley, Jr., Doubting Thomas: Law, Politics
and Hypocrisy, WASH. POST, July 7, 1991, at BI ("[Oinly ideology-theory laced with political preferenc-
es-can provide us with an answer" to difficult questions about "where to draw the line between legislating
from the bench and mere interpretation of statutes or the Constitution.").
16. Pp. 26, 47.
17. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989).
18. It is eagerness to constrain the Court that gives currency to the politically charged concept of
"originalism"--the idea that the Constitution must be interpreted to mean what it was understood to mean
by those who wrote and ratified it. On the varieties of originalism, see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
19. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493 (1988).
20. Michelman, supra note 19, at 1496.
21. Pp. 57-60.
22. Wellington relies heavily on the example of Justice Hugo Black, an adherent of originalist
methodology, but also a Justice that Wellington credits with giving the Warren Court, much of whose work




Wellington brings a similar charge against John Ely's representation-
reinforcement theory, which calls for judicial deference to the judgments of
politically accountable institutions except when entrenched groups attempt to
thwart democratic -change or prejudice corrupts the political process.'
Wellington argues that judges would need to make contestable decisions in
order to implement this theory; like originalism, it might hide but could not
eliminate the need for courts to make value judgments.' According to Wel-
lington, Ely's theory shares with originalism another, more disturbing defect:
both encourage judges to ask the wrong questions. The Supreme Court, Wel-
lington suggests, should accept responsibility for producing a body of constitu-
tional law that is workable and morally acceptable, and it can best carry out
this task by proceeding in the traditional, lawyerly way of framing principles
appropriate to the case at hand.25
Wellington parts company here with those who would convert the Supreme
Court to a philosophers' academy. The Justices, Wellington argues, are practical
lawyers, not philosophers, and their job requires negotiation and compromise. 2
If we asked the Justices to become philosophers, we should expect not only bad
philosophy but worse law than we have now. 7
III
Many of Wellington's best arguments, as he recognizes, are old-fashioned
and derivative. In particular, his approach reflects the work of two former Yale
colleagues, Charles Black' s and Alexander Bickel.29
From Black, Wellington takes the important insight that judicial review is
as functionally crucial when it "legitimates" as when it invalidates government
23. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
24. Pp. 67-71.
25. Pp. 77-123.
26. Pp. 15, 80-82.
27. Although he denies that constitutional adjudication is a form of moral philosophy, Wellington does
not suggest that moral values are irrelevant to the Supreme Court's mission. On the contrary, he emphasizes
that the Constitution is an open-ended text, e.g., pp. 48, 72, 77, and that its interpretation is inextricably
bound up with values and politics, e.g., pp. 83, 158. For a discussion of the nature of this connection, see
infra text accompanying notes 40-46.
28. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY
(1960).
29. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS (1962). Interpreting the Constitution is distinctively a Yale book. Wellington takes particular
aim at the approaches of two other former Yale colleagues, Robert Bork and John Ely. Each, Wellington
argues, would constrain the judicial role too narrowly. See pp. 44. 66-72. Among constitutional theorists
coming after the generation of Black and Bickel, Yale professor Bruce Ackerman is singled out as having
important insights. See pp. 65-66. Wellington's theory of interpretation also shows the pervasive influence
of one-time Yale professor Ronald Dworkin. The book is therefore an interesting reminder of how much
Yale Law School has contributed to constitutional law and theory. Is it churlish to wonder whether
Wellington might have benefitted from a similar engagement with the ideas of Harvard's Frank Michelman
or Chicago's Cass Sunstein?
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action."0 Measured against original intent and understanding, many of the
central functions and institutions of modern government would be constitution-
ally problematic 3 t The Framers never contemplated, and the Constitution
makes no specific provision for, federal regulation of an integrated national
economy, independent agencies, or a welfare bureaucracy. Although Congress
and the executive branch have taken the lead in structuring a government
adequate to changing times, the courts have played a vital role in conferring
legitimacy. The Supreme Court, as disinterested an arbiter as our system can
furnish,32 has legitimated the pertinent adaptations not as naked assertions of
power but as reasonable accommodations that do not threaten fundamental
constitutional principles.
Legitimation is, of course, less troublingly "counter majoritarian"3 3 than
judicial invalidation3 4 It is sometimes argued that the appropriate approach
would be one of judicial deference to the political branches.35 To this argu-
ment Wellington gets his best response, which he quotes at least three times,
from Bickel: Actions by politically responsive officials frequently have two as-
pects-their immediate, intended effect in responding to some perceived
problem and their secondary, easily overlooked impact on time-honored princi-
ples.36 Courts, Bickel argued, are more likely than legislatures to function as
effective custodians of long-term values.
37
Here, however, a familiar dilemma emerges. How is the Supreme Court
to protect moral values without becoming a moral tyrant? Wellington appears
to believe that the Supreme Court makes law in every practical sense, 8 based
on substantially moral judgments, but in doing so poses little threat of moral
tyranny. He offers at least four arguments in support of this belief.
First, Wellington claims that the Justices are bound to rely on "public
morality," rather than their own, when allowing values to influence constitution-
al decisions. He rightly refrains, however, from giving this argument too much
weight. Among other difficulties, Wellington is never wholly clear about what
"public morality" is. He says that public morality must be identified through
a "unique form of interpretation" 39 that attends to "widely shared"' attitudes,
and he illustrates his understanding by imagining how "we"'" would respond
30. See pp. 24-25. For Black's pioneering discussion, see BLACK, supra note 28, at 46-86.
31. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
32. P. 84.
33. E.g., p. 26. The term comes from Bickel. See BICKEL, supra note 29, at 16.
34. As Charles Black pointed out, however, the Supreme Court could not effectively perform its
legitimating function if it lacked a mandate to invalidate as well. BLACK, supra note 28, at 53, 87.
35. Pp. 72-74.
36. Pp. 25, 29, 83.
37. BICKEL, supra note 29, at 24-28.






to a variety of hypothesized moral questions related to marriage, contraception,
and abortion4 2 But he never quite comes to grips with the challenge posed
by cultural pluralism.43 Even more importantly, Wellington acknowledges that
the identification of public morality is an "interactive"' process, in which the
views that a Justice begins with will often influence what she finds.' Indeed,
Wellington goes a step further. The Justices, he maintains, should try "to 'read'
public values in a way that accentuates what they.., believe to be desirable
for the country." 6
As a second guarantee that judicial lawmaking will not amount to moral
tyranny, Wellington calls attention to conventions of legal reasoning 7 Famil-
iar conventions establish, for example, that courts, including the Supreme Court,
must acknowledge the relevance of various sources of authority and must
follow precedent unless they can persuasively distinguish or are prepared to
overrule it. But the restraints of convention-though they undoubtedly ex-
ist-are comparatively weak at the Supreme Court level. The Court need not
tailor its interpretive process to avoid reversal by some higher body. It is free
to overrule its own precedents. Loose theories of precedent accord the Justices
great flexibility in identifying what past decisions stand for. Moreover, the
applicable conventions are subject to change,' and the Supreme Court has
important power in defining what the conventions are.
Third, Wellington notices that Supreme Court decisions frequently are less
"final" than is widely assumed.49 The Court often rests its holdings on
nonconstitutional grounds and thereby permits legislative revision. Prior cases
can be distinguished or overruled when subsequent developments suggest that
the Court misgauged public morality. As Wellington appreciates, however, the
Court need not take any of these steps. It has sometimes held its ground against
manifest popular sentiment,50 and it may do so again.
42. Pp. 99-123.
43. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1713 (1988) (emphasizing
diversity of American subcultures and risks of attempts at homogenization).
44. Pp. 86, 149.
45. See p. 149.
46. Pp. 149-50.
47. See, e.g., pp. 14-17, 80, 86-87.
48. Pp. 14-17.
49. E.g., pp. 34-40.
50. During the roughly three decades of the so-called Lochner era, beginning about the time of Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S.45 (1905), and persisting into the mid-1930's, the Supreme Court struck down nearly
200 regulations on substantive due process grounds. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 445 (12th
ed. 1991). "Regulations of prices, labor relations (including wages and hours), and conditions forentry into
business"--which both the state and national legislatures persisted in enacting--"were especially vulnerable."
Id. at 444-45. More recently, the Supreme Court refused to yield after its decision invalidating a state statute
prohibiting flag desecration, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), triggered swift enactment of the Flag
Protection Act of 1989. Although passed by "overwhelming majorities in each house [of Congress],"
GUNTHER, supra, at 1246, the Act was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
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Wellington therefore places principal reliance on his final argument against
the possibility of moral tyranny by an unelected judiciary: the Supreme Court
is subject to political constraints. There are limits, he argues, to the public's
capacity to "digest" judicial pronouncements of constitutional norms. 1 The
notorious Dred Scott case,52 according constitutional protection to slavery in
the federal territories, proved indigestible in Wellington's sense. So, by the end,
had the substantive due process doctrine of the Lochner era.
5 3
IV
Although Wellington sees politics and digestibility as setting the outer
bounds of judicial power, he also believes that there are norms of craft that,
if followed by the Supreme Court, are conducive to decisions that are not only
tolerable but also wise, prudent, and morally attractive.54 It is debatable, of
course, whether such norms exist and, if they do, whether they are attractive.
5
But Wellington takes a generally optimistic view. 6 The path to constitutional
wisdom, he says, lies in "the common law method."57 Unfortunately, perhaps
the least successful sections of Interpreting the Constitution are those aimed
at explicating the common law method as Wellington conceives it.
Wellington's main idea seems to be that courts should reach constitutional
decisions by relying on at least five different kinds of "sources of law": the
Constitution's text, its structure and history, precedent, and public morality.5
But beyond enumerating these sources, and suggesting that the ways in which
courts deal with them are familiar,59 Wellington offers no systematic exposi-
tion. Instead, he uses a specimen case to exhibit his idealized method, and that
case, involving the constitutional permissibility of abortion regulation, seems
ill-adapted to its purpose. Wellington's argument that public morality supports
51. E.g., pp. 19, 40, 127-58.
52. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
53. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). It is digestibility, or resonance with widely and
staunchly held public values, that Wellington sees as marking the distinction between modem substantive
due process cases that identify fundamental liberty or privacy interests--of which he treats Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as paradigmatic-and now discredited cases, such as Lochner, that were
concerned with economic liberties. See pp. 94-95.
54. Although Wellington does not expressly draw the distinction, I take him to acknowledge a
difference between the rules, conventions, and political forces that define the outer bounds of law, transgres-
sion of which would count as judicial lawlessness, and the norms of craft that mark judicial excellence
within the bounds of law.
55. Wellington worries that the relevant norms have too often reflected the characteristic values and
prejudices of white males. See pp. 16-19.
56. He himself more commonly describes his view as "not pessimistic," p. 13, or "nonpessimistic,"
p. 15.
57. P. 78.




a scheme of abortion rights similar to those recognized in Roe v. Wade6o
seems suspect in his own terms, since he appears to acknowledge that Roe may
prove "undigestible" in the roiled stomach of public opinion.61
The methodological claim that grounds Wellington's discussion is this:
Justices of the Supreme Court should identify principles that deserve judicial
protection in the constitutional text, but they should determine the "weight" of
those principles-their capacity to overcome competing considerations-by
reference to public morality.62 Exactly where in the constitutional text, howev-
er, is the liberty interest in abortion rooted? If in the Due Process Clause's
prohibition against the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law,"'63 then there would be a constitutional root for literally any
"liberty interest" that anyone might wish to claim. For all practical purposes,
the constitutional text would vanish from the picture. The weight of interests,
and weight alone, would matter.
Wellington may have something more specific in mind. Perhaps he thinks
that interests in bodily autonomy that are related to sexuality and procreation
have a more specific textual pedigree, not in the spare words of the Constitu-
tion, but in judicial precedent.6r If this is so, however, he ought to explain
how lines of precedent permissibly get started. Or perhaps, again, he means that
text and precedent are both relevant, but that public morality should determine
the correct way to read them. All that seems certain is that Wellington should
say more about how the various "sources of law" interact in constitutional
decisionmaking.
Absent further elaboration, the discussion of abortion rights leaves the
impression that the Supreme Court should take its direction less from any text
than from its conception of public morality and its view of when judicial
intervention is appropriate to protect long-term values. The Court, as Wellington
sometimes says explicitly, is an institution of governance65 with a responsibili-
ty for helping to produce a body of law that is both functional and perceived
by the public as fair. Indeed, much of his prose suggests that the Supreme
Court is a political decisionmaker hemmed in only by the concern that its
decisions must not prove indigestible.
66
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see pp. 99-109. Although Wellington claims that arguments based on public
morality support the recognition of constitutional abortion rights, he acknowledges that these arguments
"do not justify the sweep of Roe v. Wade," p. 108, and that Roe, "when decided in 1973, went too far,"
p. 109.
61. See pp. 155-58.
62. See pp. 84-85.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
64. Wellington seems to put heavy weight on the entrenched status of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and other cases recognizing the existence of substantive liberty interests that are protected
under the Due Process Clause. See pp. 88-95; see also p. 84 (arguing that Court must articulate and
reinterpret principles used to interpret Constitution in past).
65. E.g., p. 3.
66. See, e.g., pp. 40, 158.
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The passages in which Wellington paints the Supreme Court as a political
decisionmaker in this sense-a partial analogue to the rejected Council of
Revision-are among the most striking in the book. Wellington says plainly
that the Court has two roles: resolving individual disputes and, more important-
ly, propounding effective regulatory rules.67 Indeed, Wellington suggests that
the Court, in playing the latter role, has revisory powers that are greater in
some ways than those contemplated for the Council of Revision proposed at
the Constitutional Convention. For the Supreme Court can revise whole bodies
of doctrine, not just reject proposed legislation, and it can also revise the
conventions of legal analysis that govern decisionmaking in the lower courts. 68
Finally, vetoes of legislation by the Council of Revision would have been
subject to congressional override.69 The most important decisions of the Su-
preme Court typically are not.
70
There is a good deal of insight in this bracing portrait of Supreme Court
power and responsibility,71 which is the more startling for being presented in
plain language, shorn of philosophical pretense, that draws support mostly from
older works of scholarship. It is unclear, though, whether Wellington wishes
to endorse this view, however immanent it may be in much of his book. For
his formal claim, as I have said, is that the Supreme Court characteristically
does and should adhere to a common law method of constitutional adjudication.
And this implies, according to Wellington, that the Court must treat public
morality as a source of law, but is otherwise deeply "constrained by the meth-
odological and substantive conventions of adjudication."72 Wellington seems
ultimately to be of two minds about this issue, and the strands of his thought





69. See I FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 8, at 21.
70. But cf. pp. 34-38 (explaining how some Supreme Court decisions can in fact be overridden by
Congress).
71. In carrying out its responsibility to help produce a workable and acceptable body of law, the
Supreme Court is undoubtedly a more distinctively judicial body than the proposed Council of Revision.
Not only does the Court produce reasoned opinions, full of citations to distinctively legal authority; it also
refuses to render "advisory opinions," and its adjudication of concrete "cases" tends to focus the issues
presented for decision on the factual setting of a particular dispute. But when the national interest in a swift
judicial resolution of a general constitutional question is clear, especially when Congress has enacted
facilitative legislation, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to render "declaratory judgments" even
on the constitutional permissibility of omnibus statutes such as the Federal Election Commission Act and
its 1974 amendments. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
72. P. 86.




Although Wellington frequently portrays the Supreme Court as a compara-
tively freewheeling, relatively political, yet philosophically undisciplined
decisionmaker, his tone is generally complacent. He is uninterested in infusing
the methodology of Supreme Court adjudication with philosophical rigor. The
Court, he suggests, is not very philosophical now, yet is doing fine when its
performance is viewed in the long term.74
Wellington by no means eschews the giving of advice, however. Beyond
commending continued adherence to the common law method, he counsels that
the Justices should draw insight from an abundance of sources and perspectives.
He welcomes the pluralization of the legal culture, as the clubby conventions
of a practice dominated by white, middle and upper class males encounter
increasing resistance from those who find covert biases in traditional modes
of analysis.75 Indeed, he suggests that Supreme Court deliberations should
reflect the views of all segments of society.
76
Because he views Supreme Court decisionmaking as substantially political,
Wellington regards the selection of Supreme Court Justices as appropriately
political as well.77 He argues that both the President and the Senate are enti-
tled to take an interest in a prospective Justice's opinions about the role of the
Supreme Court in general and about controversial issues in particular.7 He
similarly welcomes demonstrations, marches, and other peaceful displays desig-
ned to influence the Court's assessment of public morality.
79
74. In an occasional departure from this theme, Wellington argues that the Court does better to root
its conclusions in arguments of principle than in concerns of instrumental expediency. Pp. 135-40. He
suggests, for example, that the Court was on treacherous territory when it justified the rule of New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which protects even false and defamatory statements about public
officials unless the speaker acted with "reckless disregard" for the truth, on the ground that this standard
is necessary to prevent the chilling of politically valuable speech. Wellington appears to view the case as
rightly decided but wrongly reasoned. Criticizing the Court's argument that without "breathing room" the
press might become too timorous, he argues that the Court is no expert on these matters and ought not risk
being proved wrong by relying on predictive and empirical judgments. Pp. 136-40. But the line between
the Court's resting a decision on (1) a judgment of principle and (2) a judgment of what is practically
necessary to vindicate aprinciple is exceedingly fine. See David Strauss, The Ubiquity ofProphylacticRules,
55 U. Cm. L. REv. 190,192-205,207 (1988) (denying existence of sharp distinction between "prophylactic"
rules and rules commonly accepted as reflecting interpretation, and affirming that courts "constantly...
create constitutional doctrine by taking into account both the principles and values reflected in the relevant
constitutional provisions and institutional realities"). Although Wellington says the Court's job is to lay
down regulations for the future, see, e.g., p. 3, he occasionally sounds as if he would deny it the tools to
perform this function effectively.
75. Pp. 17-19.
76. See p. 155.
77. See pp. 150-53.
78. Although Wellington accepts a politicized appointments process, he offers several implicit cautions,
of which one seems especially timely. The Supreme Court is in its own way a representative institution,
with a special responsibility at least to appreciate the varied moral outlooks that help to comprise what
Wellington terms our "public morality." "[A] public morality must be as inclusive as possible," he writes,
"and adjudication needs its substitutes for the access and accountability that theoretically exist where
regulation is by legislation.' P. 155.
79. See pp. 156-57.
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This analysis seems sensible in its own terms, but it again highlights the
duality in Wellington's thought. On the one hand, he says the Supreme Court
is an appropriately political and indeed politicized institution; but on the other
hand, he tells us, its methodology characteristically has been and should contin-
ue to be the familiar, convention-bound, lawyer's approach associated with
common law adjudication. Can he-can we-have it both ways?
If he can, it must be because two of the most crucial terms in his analy-
sis--"common law" and "political"-are exceedingly loose. Wellington's
references to common law adjudication typically associate it with the traditional,
the familiar, the unproblematic. Much, if not most, of the time, his is the
common law tradition of complacent lawyers and patriotic orators: the engine
that slowly, incrementally, and in the shadow of the legislature maintains a
tolerable coherence between legal doctrine and society's changing needs and
moral outlook.80 But there is, of course, another side. Some have questioned
whether the common law, which allows judges to weigh policy concerns and
to revise rules in the process of applying them, properly deserves to be called
"law" at all.8' Common law judges, on this view, look disconcertingly like
policymakers.
The term "political" is, if anything, even more variable in range and
connotation. What does it mean for a judicial decision or philosophy to be
political? It may help to distinguish three (among many) possible meanings.8 2
First, a decision may be "political" in the sense of being calculated to influence
someone else's subsequent voting decision. Decisions by electorally accountable
officials are often thought to be political in this way. Similarly, it is at least
imaginable that judges might trade votes or frame their decisions with an eye
toward influencing the outcome of elections. Second, a decision may be "politi-
cal" in the sense of reflecting a view about what is fair or just that is testable
only under the ordinary, contestable standards of debate concerning questions
80. See supra note 3.
81. See supra note 3.
82. Some of the best, recent works of constitutional theory have distinguished among different kinds
of "politics." See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-33, 230-322 (1991) (distin-
guishing "normal" politics, in which most citizens' degree of engagement with fundamental issues is
relatively low, from "constitutional" politics, in which aroused citizenry engages seriously and deeply with
issues ofjustice and appropriate governmental structure); Michelman, supra note 19, at 1503-15 (distinguish-
ing "republican" or "jurisgenerative" politics, involving deliberation building upon and aiming to achieve
normative consensus, from "pluralist" politics, in which individuals and groups seek to advance their
particularistic interests); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-58
(1988) (distinguishing "pluralist" politics, in which citizens and groups strive to advance preconceived
interests, from "republican" or "deliberative" politics, aimed at identifying through deliberation a shared
conception of the public good) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN'. L. REV. 29,31-33,45-59 (1985) (distinguishing "pluralist" or"factional"
politics, in which groups and individuals seek to promote private interests, from "republican" or "Madison-




of ultimate good and right.3 Adjudication would be unavoidably political in
this sense if legal reasoning could not be meaningfully distinguished from moral
reasoning. Third, a decision might be "political" by involving judgments of
what is good or right under particular circumstances, but still be constrained
in a way that purely moral or political decisions are not. A process of decision
might be political in this third way and yet be subject to either or both of two
constraints. Applicable rules or conventions might create only a bounded
discretion to take moral or policy considerations into account. For example, it
might be agreed that moral principles should be appealed to only to resolve
uncertainties arising from the vagueness, open texture, or ambiguity of a set
of written rules. Moreover, rules or conventions might timit the substance of
the moral values that a court could accord weight.
Wellington suggests that accepted conventions of adjudication, as reflected
in Supreme Court practice, allow constitutional decisions to be political only
in something like the third, constrained sense' and that, so long as this is so,
political adjudication by the Supreme Court is analogous enough to common
law decisionmaking so as not to be especially troublesome. But the argument
does not quite come off. First, and most obviously, the Supreme Court's
constitutional pronouncements do not, like those of a common law court, occur
in the shadow of a legislature with primary lawmaking responsibilities. How
much like a common law court could a Court with such nearly ultimate powers
be?
Second, it is doubtful that the relevant conventions effectively constrain the
Supreme Court to the extent that the common law analogy suggests. As Wel-
lington appears to recognize, there are no clear legal bounds to the ability of
a majority of the Court to alter not only specific doctrinal rules, but also the
general framework within which the lower courts approach constitutional issues.
The requirement of political digestibility defines the operational outer limit.'
Third, however much the Court may have respected generally restraining
conventions in the past, today those conventions may be loosening, largely due
to the political culture surrounding Supreme Court appointments. During the
past decade, Supreme Court nominations and confirmation proceedings have
become more "political"--in the distinctive sense of being deeply influenced
83. Cf. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 18 (1983) ("The rationality
for which [an appropriately] expanded version of legal doctrine can hope is nothing other than the modest
and potential but nevertheless significant rationality of the normal modes of moral and political controver-
sy.").
84. See, e.g., p. 82 ( while it is not quite true... neither is it false... that constitutional interpretation
is the practice of principled, non-partisan politics."). But cf. p. 81 (acknowledging that "[i]n the contest for
votes, it would appear that in addition to reasoned arguments justices have used personal flattery and
emotional appeals, and have even traded votes" and accepting judicial negotiation as "a source of law").
85. See p. 19 (characterizing political digestibility as most important constraint on judicial "reshaping"
of law); see also pp. 40, 127-58 (discussing "the politics of the indigestible").
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by specific public policy agenda and partisan electoral interestsK6 -than at any
time since the New Deal. Moreover, this increasing politicization of the nomi-
nation process 87 has occurred at a time when the Court has assumed, and is
widely expected to play, a larger role in shaping rules for the nation's gover-
nance than at any time since the Marshall Court.s As Justices who are nomi-
nated and confirmed in this political climate increasingly dominate the Court,
there is less reason than before to believe that the Court will approach its task
in the deliberate, cautious way typically associated with common law decision-
making.
Justice Thurgood Marshall believes that a brave new era of political
decisionmaking has already begun. Just before announcing his retirement from
the Court, Marshall leveled a parting blast at his colleagues for their willingness
to overturn settled doctrine.89 "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this
Court's decisionmaking," he said.' ° Marshall claimed that the Court was
failing to act in an appropriately judicial manner, by which he presumably
meant that it should proceed like a common law court-cautiously, incre-
mentally, and with a heavy presumption against innovation.
Marshall's charges are by no means implausible,91 but they raise an issue
of their own. about consistency in appraisal: Does Marshall's critique exhibit
the same kind of dualistic thinking that I have criticized in Wellington? Surely
it would have been astonishing to hear Marshall direct a similar critique at the
Warren Court, or at the Court of the late New Deal, both of which were fully
as revisionary as the current Rehnquist Court. It is all too easy to laud the
Supreme Court as a Council of Revision when we like its substantive drift, but
to hold it to the standards of a common law court when we do not. 2
86. See John H. Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where
Courts Are No Different From Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 843-44 (1991).
87. See id. at 84849.
88. Although there is a long history of Presidents attempting to appoint Justices with congenial views,
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985), the Court has not always enjoyed
the prominent role that it has today, and many of the early Senate rejections of Supreme Court nominees
involved state politics and similarly parochial disputes in an era when the Justices were required to "ride
circuit." See Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1146 (1988).
89. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619-25 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2619.
91. Over the past couple of Terms the Supreme Court has acquired a powerful, substantively conserva-
tive momentum. See, e.g., Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom
Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REV. 43, 53-60 (1990). A majority has either overruled or, more commonly,
brushed aside a number of precedents that stood in the way of its preferred results. See, e.g., Payne, 111
S. Ct. at 2597 (overruling two prior cases); Employment Division v. Smith, I10 S. Ct. 1595, 1599-1606
(1990) (distinguishing and limiting cases finding facially neutral state legislation imposing disproportionate
burdens on members of particular religious groups must be justified by reference to "compelling state
interest").
92. There are a number of fascinating parallels between the Warren and the Rehnquist Courts, several
of which illuminate the facility with which liberals and conservatives alike can drift between incompatible
pictures of the appropriate judicial role. When the Warren Court made criminal procedural decisions non-
retroactive, in order to facilitate its revolutionizing of the constitutional law of criminal procedure, conserva-
tives howled that courts could not, like legislatures, limit the retroactivity of their decisions. See Richard
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My own strong instinct, after reading Wellington's book, is to think that
those of us who wish to assess the Supreme Court need to avoid a sort of
careless mental drifting, in which we sometimes imagine the Supreme Court
as comfortingly analogous to an ordinary common law court and sometimes
as thrillingly similar to a Council of Revision, but pay too little attention to how
the images can be integrated. Wellington tells us "it" is not broken, so we do
not need to fix it.93 But what sort of thing is this "it," and what would count
as its being broken?
VI
For me, Interpreting the Constitution provokes a number of thoughts in
response to this question. Some are consistent, some dissonant, with
Wellington's analysis.
A
It is a signal virtue of Wellington's book that it deals systematically with
a variety of aspects of constitutional lawmaking that might be praised, pilloried,
or simply described as "political": (1) conventions of legal reasoning, (2) the
value judgments that Justices can and sometimes must make, (3) the judicial
nomination and confirmation process, and (4) the requirement of "digestibility."
Clearly it is time to get past sloganeering about law being just another form
of politics. We ought to move on with the hard work of analyzing "politics"
as well as "law" and figuring out what the specific relationships-for surely
there are many-between politics and the production of our constitutional law
ought to be.94 But while Wellington offers a number of insights, he fails to
integrate them into a strong, normative theory. More work needs to be done.
Wellington is not the first, of course, to try to sort out the sundry relation-
ships between "law" and "politics." Ronald Dworkin 95 and Frank
Michelman,96 to cite just two contemporary theorists, have contributed impor-
tantly to our understanding of necessary and appropriate judicial politics. Their
work, however, offers the problematic prescription that judges should be moral
H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1731, 1734 (1991). More recently, however, the conservative Rehnquist Court has deployed the
retroactivity doctrine for its own purposes in the criminal law area, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), and it is liberals who are raising complaints focused on the appropriate nature of the judicial role.
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra, at 1797-98 & n.355, 1804-07.
93. P. 9 ("On the judicial side.., there is nothing to repair, for nothing is broken .... "); p. 153 (it
is neither "a dirty little secret" nor "an institutional failure" that "constitutional law is shaped, influenced,
indeed made by those authorized to interpret").
94. A number of notable works have recently taken this general line of approach, see supra note 82,
though not precisely in the way suggested here.
95. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 19.
96. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 19.
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philosophers. Current Supreme Court Justices are unlikely to turn to philosophy
with much enthusiasm or aptitude, and the notion that the Justices are philoso-
phers willy nilly, albeit not very good ones, is a philosophers' conceit. Nor, if
recent experience is any guide, are philosophers of the first order likely to get
named to the Supreme Court anytime soon. Although ideal theory is often
illuminating, the practical choice is likely to be between second-best and
something worse. It is time to think harder and more systematically about
second-best.
This, in a loose sense, is the project of constitutional scholars as diverse
as Bruce Ackerman, Vincent Blasi, Frederick Schauer, Steven Shiffrin, Cass
Sunstein, and Guido Calabresi. Rather than promoting the Supreme Court as
a relatively unconstrained moral decisionmaker, Ackerman asks us to consider
viewing the Constitution as capable of being effectively amended by profound
changes in public opinion.97 Blasi,98 Schauer,99 and Shiffrin t00 invite the
Court to remain alert to recurring pathologies of American democratic politics.
Their animating idea is that it is easier for the Court to develop a clear picture
of evils to be averted than of the good society to be pursued. Sunstein, in a
number of important articles, has tried to sort the politics that deserve judicial
respect from the politics that do not and has striven to furnish judges with
workable interpretive tools.101 Finally, Dean Calabresi has recently explored
techniques through which the Supreme Court might maintain a judicial check
on legislative choices that impress it as rash or insensitive, but without claiming




Thought about a world of constitutional second-best must also attend to the
processes of judicial selection. As Wellington makes clear, lawyerly acumen
is helpful, but seldom sufficient, for the Supreme Court's largest challenges.
In a contemporary context, these challenges include the constitutional issues
surrounding race and gender discrimination, affirmative action, abortion and
substantive due process claims, and the use of administrative agencies and other
independent government officials who fit uneasily into the traditional separation
97. See ACKERMAN, supra note 82.
98. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521.
99. See Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 921-35 (1984); Frederick
Schauer, The Second Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1989).
100. See STEVEN SHIWFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990).
101. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNsTEIN, BEYONDTHE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATO-
RY STATE 160-226 (1990); Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 82; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra
note 82.
102. See Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitu-
tional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1991).
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of powers model. Whom would we want, or trust, to resolve issues of this
kind?
This question is obviously a "political" one, but Wellington is right that
politics has no necessary aura of tawdriness. Politics can be good as well as
bad, bipartisan as well as partisan. Wellington stops short of offering a substan-
tive theory of "good" politics, and I do not have one either. 103 But one con-
cept of local relevance might be that of "bipartisanship." This once-famillar
notion, which has fallen into near desuetude, implies that some issues, although
irreducibly "political," sufficiently implicate the common, long-term interests
of the vast bulk of the American public that it would be treacherous for elected
officials to "play politics" with them. The selection of Supreme Court Justices,
within a healthier, longer-sighted national politics, might well qualify as a
matter of "bipartisan" concern.
As between the President and the Senate, there should be a genuinely
consultative process"° aimed at identifying people suited not just for technical
lawyering but for statecraft and even an element of moral stewardship.10 5
Senators should not apologize for holding Presidential nominees to this stan-
dard. If it takes a seemingly partisan stand by Senate Democrats to launch a
politics of bipartisanship-for example, concerted refusal to confirm nominees
selected to further a narrowly partisan agenda-there should be no apology
about the surface paradox. But what is good for the goose is good for the
gander. As Bruce Ackerman has argued, outside of extraordinary eras when the
people themselves exhibit profound commitments to historically novel under-
standings of fairness and appropriate institutional structure'6--such as oc-
curred during Reconstruction and the New Deal07--efforts to use appoint-
ments to move the Supreme Court either to the left or to the right of a plausible
politics of bipartisanship should be viewed as suspect-as "playing politics"
in an appropriately pejorative use of that term. 08
C
However Justices are appointed, questions remain about how they should
view their role, and about how those of us who are not Justices should assess
103. For useful and provocative attempts to develop such theories, see ACKERMAN, supra note 82;
Michelman, supra note 19; Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 82; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra
note 82.
104. This would not be unprecedented. See TRIBE, supra note 88, at 80-81, 126-28.
105. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial
Selection, 61 S. CAL L. REv. 1735 (1988) (judging requires mixture of intellectual and moral virtues).
106. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988).
107. See ACKERMAN, supra note 82; discussion infra note 109.
108. See ACKERMAN, supra note 82, at 53 (noting problems associated with "transformative appoint-
ments" through which Presidents, if"they can convince a bare majority of the Senate to consent," can cause
"constitutional law [to] be jolted onto a new course without persuasive institutional evidence that a mobilized
majority of the American people support the change").
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the Supreme Court's performance. Following Wellington, I have accepted that
the Court must sometimes practice statecraft and sometimes function as a moral
conscience, and that Justices should be selected with these functions in mind.
Moreover, I agree that the Supreme Court can-and sometimes probably
should-effect relatively large revisions of settled constitutional law.t°9 But
there is, of course, another side. Sometimes, again in step with Wellington, my
instincts tell me that the Court should act within a narrower conception of the
judicial role. To be quite frank about it, my instincts tell me that right now. To
be even more frank, however, I have to suspect my own motives, since I know
that I dislike the current Court's increasingly conservative substantive drift. It
is therefore tempting for me, as for Justice Marshall, to demand that this Court
should act more like a common law court and less like a Council of Revi-
sion. 10
But would this be just another example of careless mental drifting? How
do the Court's functions-some analogous to those of a common law court,
some analogous to those of a Council of Revision-fit together? Is the decision
to adopt one or the other mode entirely political and, if so, "political" in what
sense? To my mind, Wellington never deals adequately with these questions.
Perhaps they have no satisfactory answers. A respected tradition holds that
practical wisdom is inherently contextual and defies reduction to rule like
norms. More seems needed, however, than Interpreting the Constitution sup-
plies,,'
A possible approach to the problem of drifting and dualistic thought about
the Supreme Court's proper role might be to recognize the existence of two
paradigms-common law court and Council of Revision-that the Supreme
Court sometimes should approximate. Ideally, of course, we would develop
standards peculiarly appropriate to the hybrid. But if that task seems too
109. I am unsure whether this position is consistent or inconsistent with the theory of the judicial role
supported in Bruce Ackerman's recent, important book. See id. Ackerman argues that our Constitution has
been effectively amended, in ways not captured by Article V, by the profound changes in popular attitude
and belief that occurred during Reconstruction and the New Deal. See id. at 44-57. He further suggests that
the appropriate judicial function is one of synthesizing and applying the political judgments of the American
people reached during periods of the heightened political awareness that can generate higher lawmaking.
See id. at 131-62, 261-65. Although I am sympathetic to much of Ackerman's argument, I do not be-
lieve-and it is unclear to me whether he believes-that, outside of periods of "constitutional" politics, see
id. at 6-33, 230-322, courts could not justify substantial doctrinal overhauls at least partly by reference to
contemporary moral or prudential concerns. To be slightly more concrete, I am doubtful whether, as
Ackerman suggests, see id. at 133-62, cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)-which I join the great mass of contemporary lawyers
in approving-can be successfully rationalized as reflecting essentially backward-looking syntheses. In short,
although I agree with Ackerman that constitutional lawmaking does indeed occur through periods of high
politics in ways not captured by Article V, I am doubtful that either the practical or the conceptual universe
is quite so binary as he sometimes seems to suggest, and I believe that the Supreme Court can and should
engage in what is for all practical purposes interstitial, even revisory lawmaking.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
111. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (1986).
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daunting, we can begin with a question of priority and emphasis. Which is the
better model most of the time?
Although I have made much (perhaps too much) of the analogy of the
Supreme Court to a Council of Revision, the contrasts between the two institu-
tions are at least as illuminating as the similarities are. First, the Justices are
required to work with a fabric of doctrine and precedent that must be kept in
order for people who want to know what the law is today and what it will be
tomorrow. However much the Supreme Court's functions may overlap those
of an imagined Council of Revision, the Court cannot escape being a court, and
it has the responsibility to maintain a body of precedent that is usable as law.
Second, as Wellington emphasizes, the Supreme Court does not merely reject
laws that it finds objectionable; it also produces affirmative legal rules.11 2 The
promulgation of broad new rules, or the abandonment of old ones, can have
ripple effects through the doctrinal and practical landscapes that do not flow
from the mere nullification of proposed legislation. The Supreme Court may
not be well situated either to anticipate such effects or to deal with them.
These contrasts suggest that the Supreme Court should normally proceed
more modestly than boldly, in accord with conventional adjudicative constraints
and with norms of craft such as those that Wellington associates with the
common law method. In other words, the Supreme Court should recognize a
presumptive obligation to proceed narrowly, cautiously, and within the frame-
work of existing doctrine. The presumption should be subject to override,
however, when competing moral or political concerns are sufficiently power-
ful. 113
Fortunately or unfortunately, the requisite calculation could never be
captured in an algorithm. In making that calculation, however, a third contrast
between the Supreme Court and the proposed Council of Revision needs to be
kept in mind: decisions of the Council of Revision would have been subject
to legislative rejection, while those of the Supreme Court often are not. At some
level, this factor undoubtedly counsels judicial self-restraint. But, as Wellington
reminds us, the degree of difference between Supreme Court judgments and
those of a Council of Revision is more variable than constant." 4 There are
techniques of judicial inquiry that permit invalidation yet still leave politically
accountable officials-if they are clear and resolute-free to proceed in ways
112. See, e.g., p. 3.
113. There is a close analogy between this prescription for constitutional adjudication and the
jurisprudential theory that Frederick Schauer has denominated "presumptive positivism." See, e.g., Frederick
Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645 (1991). According to presumptive
positivism, judges characteristically do and should follow established legal rules and conventions unless
to do so would conflict egregiously with a value or policy of supervening importance. See id. at 674-79.
The significance of this position is that, in addition to cases in which judges would regard the legally
dictated outcome as desirable, there would be "some cases in which the recognized rule indicated a result
that conflicted with [a moral value or social policy], but not so egregiously that it [was] worth setting aside
the result indicated" by legal rules or conventions. Id. at 676.
114. See pp. 34-40 (noting Supreme Court decisions frequently lack "finality").
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that impress the Justices as constitutionally dubious. The Court, for example,
can demand explicitly clear language before construing a statute to achieve
effects that the Justices regard as constitutionally problematic or imprudent.'
In addition, legislation can be invalidated not because the ends are impermis-
sible, but because the chosen means impose unfair or disproportionate burdens
on particular, disadvantaged groups. 16 When the Court proceeds in this way,
political officials are not precluded from taking a second, more considered look.
Because the risk of judicial autocracy is diminished, the Supreme Court should
feel at least somewhat freer to adopt a revisory substantive stance when its
judgments can be so framed as to permit legislative override.
17
If this analysis of the Supreme Court's role sounds like trying to "have it
both ways"--claiming that the Court appropriately acts both like a common
law court and like a Council of Revision-it at least encourages clarity about
which way we are trying to have it at any particular time, and why the choice
is appropriate to the matter in question.
VII
For its intended audience of nonlawyers, Interpreting the Constitution is
right on target. It reduces large problems and abstractions to the language of
common sense, and it strips away much of the mystery that too often surrounds
constitutional adjudication.
For legal academics, Wellington's book poses a challenge: Have we imag-
ined the Supreme Court's proper role too much in our own (idealized) im-
age-as the political philosophers, the clear seers of principle, that we would
like it to be? Are we urging the Court, and encouraging each other to want the
Court, to reason and act in a way that it never plausibly could? After reading
this lucid and provocative book, I am inclined to think so.
The question then remains: How should we envision the Supreme Court
as it moves toward the twenty-first century? Wellington, like many of us, seems
to have a dualistic view of the Supreme Court-sometimes thinking of it as a
convention-bound institution closely analogous to other courts, sometimes as
a relatively unconstrained moral and political decisionmaker. To integrate those
two images remains a pressing task.
115. See Calabresi, supra note 102, at 119-20, 122-23.
116. See id. at 114-19.
117. See Id. at 131-37.
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